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Abstract: This work studies Nash equilibria for heterogeneous games where both coordinating
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Keywords: Game theory, coordination games, anti-coordination games, multi-agent systems,
modelling and decision making in complex systems.
1. INTRODUCTION
In games of strategic complements, the best response ac-
tion of a player is increasing in the action of the other
players. Examples of such games include the adoption of
a new technology, beliefs or behavioral attitudes in so-
cial influence systems, or cooperative interchanges among
economical actors. In games of strategic substitutes just
the opposite happens, the best response action of a player
is decreasing in the action of the other players. Appli-
cations of such models include, for example, local public
good provision, information gathering, firms interacting in
competitive markets.
While these two classes of games have received consid-
erable attention in recent literature (Jackson and Zenou
(2015), Bramoulle´ (2007)), relatively unexplored are mixed
models where these two strategic interactions coexist.
However, examples of social or economic model where such
behaviors coexist are rather frequent, e.g., collecting ac-
tions, interacting firms with cooperative and competitive
features.
In this paper, we focus on a particular instance of such het-
erogeneous models. We consider games where actions are
all binary {−1,+1} and players are split into two classes:
one of coordinating agents and one of anti-coordinating
agents. That of coordination and anti-coordination games
are two basic examples of games with respectively strate-
gic complements and strategic substitutes. Coordinating
agents have an incentive for action 1 when such action
is played by a fraction of the remaining players above a
certain threshold while anti-coordinating agents have an
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incentive for action 1 when such action is played by a
fraction of the remaining players below a certain threshold.
We will refer to such models as mixed coordination/anti-
coordination (CAC) games.
Our aim is to study Nash equilibria in mixed CAC games.
Pure coordination games and pure anti-coordination
games always admit Nash equilibria as they are poten-
tial games (Monderer and Shapley (1996)) also when the
thresholds are heterogeneous. Instead general mixed CAC
games are no longer potential and the existence of Nash
equilibria is not guaranteed. Furthermore, even when exis-
tence is guaranteed, the set of Nash equilibria is in general
unknown. For the special case of coordinating agents with
identical thresholds, a characterization of the Nash equi-
libria was proposed by Morris (2000).
There is a related literature where the best-response dy-
namics is analyzed, in particular its convergence to Nash
equilibria. Ramazi et al. (2016) proved that the asyn-
chronous best-response dynamics of pure coordination
games and pure anti-coordination games will almost surely
converge to Nash equilibria for every network topology
and every set of thresholds. Granovetter (1978) studied
the synchronous best-response dynamics of coordinating
agents as a linear threshold model. Similar results have
been generalized to configuration models by Rossi et al.
(2017) and to games with a mixture of coordinating and
anti-coordinating agents by Grabisch and Li (2019). Other
results concern time of convergence of asynchronous best-
response dynamics and its dependence on the network
structure (Ellison (1993), Kandori et al. (1993), Montanari
and Saberi (2010)).
Our contribution is a throughout analysis on the existence
and the structure of pure strategy Nash equilibria for
mixed coordination/anti-coordination (CAC) games with
possibly heterogeneous activation thresholds. In particular
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we give the following contributions: (i) We establish a
checkable necessary and sufficient condition involving the
cumulative distribution functions for the thresholds for
the existence of NE of a general mixed CAC game with
heterogeneous thresholds; and (ii) In the special case when
only coordinating or anti-coordinating agents are present
we classify all NE and determine their cardinality. While
existence was well known in the literature, to the best of
our knowledge such precise characterization was not yet
presented.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section
2, we describe the model, we explicit the best response
function and we make some general observations on Nash
equilibria by studying the potential property of the game.
Once introduced the needed notation, to give an intuition
of the upcoming results, we conclude section 2 by providing
a brief analysis of the game with an infinite population.
In section 3, we present our main result. Specifically, we
give a necessary and sufficient condition for an action
configuration to be a Nash equilibrium of the mixed
CAC game and we provide a complete analysis of the
Nash equilibria of the coordination game and the anti-
coordination game as special cases.
2. MODEL DESCRIPTION
In this section we define a game to model the situation
where diversified agents interact with opposite interests
over a fully connected system.
2.1 Definition of the game
Let V be the agent set. Given a partition of the set Vc ∪
Va = V, Vc ∩ Va = ∅, we denote
δi :=
{
+1 if i ∈ Vc
−1 if i ∈ Va
Definition. The mixed coordination/anti-coordination(CAC)
game with agent weights {di}i∈V , di ∈ R has action set
A = {−1,+1}, action configuration space X = AV and
utilities {ui}i∈V : X → R such that
ui(xi, x−i) := δi
∑
j 6=i
xixj − dixi
 , i ∈ V (1)
Nodes in Vc ⊆ V are called coordinating agents, since they
have a positive incentive in choosing the same action of
another agent and a disadvantage in picking the opposite
one, while nodes in Va = V\Vc are called anti-coordinating
agents, as they have a disadvantage in choosing the same
action of another agent and an incentive in picking the
opposite one.
In the special cases when only one type of agents is
present, namely Vc = V or Va = V, we will simply call
it, coordination game or, respectively, anti-coordination
game.
The quantities di, i ∈ V are weights associated to the
agents. They represent the individual tendency of agents
in choosing an action over the other. Indeed, the sign of
weights di, along with δi, determines which is the risk
dominant action, i.e., which is the best action for agent
i when she is not subjected to any external influences. If
di = 0 the two actions are called risk-neutral.
2.2 Best response and Nash equilibria
Recall that, in a game, agents are assumed to be rational
and they choose their action with the aim of maximizing
the utility function. Given an agent i ∈ V and any choice
of actions x−i ∈ AV\{i}, the best response (BR) function
of the agent is defined as the set-valued function
Bi(x−i) = argmaxxi∈A ui(xi, x−i) .
In the mixed CAC game, the best response function of an
agent i ∈ V can be expressed in terms of the aggregated in-
formation on the actions played by the remaining players.
If we define, for each agent i ∈ V,
n+i (x) = |{j ∈ V \ {i} | xj = +1}| , (2)
ri :=
1
2
+
di
2(n− 1) , (3)
the best response function of an agent i ∈ V of the mixed
CAC game is given by
Bi(x−i) =

{+1} if δi(n+i (x)− ri(n− 1)) > 0
{−1} if δi(n+i (x)− ri(n− 1)) < 0
{±1} if δi(n+i (x)− ri(n− 1)) = 0
(4)
Note that n+i (x)/(n − 1) is the fraction of neighbors of
i playing action 1. Depending if this fraction is above or
below ri the best response of agent i changes. Hence, ri is
called the threshold of agent i.
We will call stubborn agents the agents having ri > 1 or
ri < −1, as their best response function is constantly equal
to {−1} or {+1}, independently of the actions of other
agents.
A Nash equilibria is any configuration x ∈ X such that
xi ∈ Bi(x−i) for any agent i ∈ V. In the following we will
denote by N the set of Nash equilibria of the game.
Both the coordination game and the anti-coordination
game, for any possible choice of the weights, are potential
games (Monderer and Shapley (1996)). This fact is very
well known in case of homogeneous thresholds, but actu-
ally holds in general. Indeed, if we define the two functions
Φc(x) =
1
2
∑
i,j∈V
i 6=j
xixj −
∑
i∈V
dixi (5)
Φa(x) = −Φc(x) (6)
we can derive from (1) that, depending if the game is a
coordination or an anti-coordination one, it respectively
holds
ui(yi, x−i)− ui(xi, x−i) = Φc(yi, x−i)− Φc(xi, x−i)
ui(yi, x−i)− ui(xi, x−i) = Φa(yi, x−i)− Φa(xi, x−i)
(7)
for all xi, yi ∈ A, x−i ∈ AV\{i}.
The potential property guarantees the existence of at least
one Nash equilibrium, which is a maximum point of the
potential function. If there are no stubborn agents, the
two consensus configurations, namely 1 and −1, are Nash
equilibria for any set of agent weights. This is a peculiar
property of coordination games. In general, an explicit
characterization of all the Nash equilibria is hard to find.
On the other hand, it is enough for a coordinating agent
to interact with an anti-coordinating agent to lose the
potential property, i.e. if Vc 6= ∅ and Va 6= ∅ the mixed
CAC game is not a potential game.
Hence, the study of Nash equilibria for the mixed CAC
game is a challenging problem and not even the existence
of such configuration is guaranteed, as the following simple
example shows.
Example. Let us consider the very simple case of a
two-player game with Vc = {1} and Va = {2} where
both agents have weights di = 0 (Fig. 1). This is known
as the discoordination game or matching pennies game,
since it describes the situation where one agent aims at
coordinating while the other wants to play an action that
is different from its opponent’s. The discoordination game
admits no Nash equilibria.
1 2
Fig. 1. The discoordination game.
2.3 The formalism of distribution functions
We now set some notation that will be used throughout
the rest of the paper.
• nc = |Vc| and na = |Va| are the number of coordinat-
ing and anti-coordinating agents respectively, while
α = nc/n is the fraction of coordinating agents.
• Given a configuration x ∈ X , we denote by z(x),
zc(x), za(x) the fraction of agents that in x are
playing action 1 in, respectively, the total population,
in the set of coordinating agents, and in the set of
anti-coordinating agents:
z(x) := n−1| {i ∈ V | xi = +1} |,
zc(x) := n
−1
c | {i ∈ Vc | xi = +1} |,
za(x) := n
−1
a | {i ∈ Va | xi = +1} |
(8)
It holds
z(x) = αzc(x) + (1− α)za(x)
Furthermore, we recall the definition of the threshold
cumulative distribution function (CDF) that returns the
fraction of the agents having threshold less or equal than
a given value. In formulas, F : R → {0, 1n , . . . , 1} is such
that
F (z) :=
1
n
|{i ∈ V | ri ≤ z}| (9)
In general, the threshold CDF is non-decreasing, piece-
wise constant and continuous to the right with discontinu-
ities occurring at points ri, i ∈ V.
Similarly, we recall that the threshold complementary cu-
mulative distribution function(CCDF) returns the fraction
of agents having threshold greater than a given value. In
formulas, G : R→ {0, 1n , . . . , 1} is such that
G(z) :=
1
n
|{i ∈ V | ri > z}| (10)
Note that G(z) = 1 − F (z). Accordingly, the threshold
CCDF is non-increasing, piece-wise constant and contin-
uous to the right with discontinuities occurring at points
ri, i ∈ V.
Fig. 2. We study the fixed point equation (13) for Example
1. On the left, we study α < 12 , on the right α >
1
2 .
We denote the threshold CDF of the coordinating agents
by Fc and threshold CCDF of the anti-coordinating agents
by Ga.
2.4 Infinite population
To give an intuition of the results that will be presented
in the next section, we will briefly study the case of an
infinite population of agents where a percentage α ∈ [0, 1]
of the population is made of coordinating agents, while
the remaining agents are anti-coordinating. Furthermore,
we assume that Fc : R → [0, 1] and Ga : R → [0, 1] are
continuous functions.
In this special case, Nash equilibria are triples z∗c , z
∗
a , z
∗ ∈
[0, 1] satisfying 
z∗c = Fc(z
∗)
z∗a = Ga(z
∗)
z∗ = αz∗c + (1− α)z∗a
(11)
If we denote
Hα(z) := αFc(z) + (1− α)Ga(z) , (12)
the system in (11) admits a solution if and only if ∃z∗ ∈
[0, 1] satisfying
z∗ = Hα(z∗) (13)
Since Hα : R→ [0, 1] is continuous, it is always possible to
find z∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that (13) is satisfied. The equilibrium
is then found by setting z∗c = Fc(z
∗
α) and z
∗
a = Ga(z
∗
α).
Hence, if the population is infinite and Fc and Ga are
continuous, the mixed CAC game admits Nash equilibria.
Example 1. If the thresholds of the coordinating agents
are uniformly distributed in [0, 1], as well as the thresholds
of the anti-coordinating agents, i.e. Fc(z) = z1[0,1](z) +
1(1,∞)(z) and Ga(z) = 1− Fc(z), then
Hα(z) = (2α− 1)z + (1− α) .
Note that Hα is increasing if α >
1
2 , namely if the coor-
dinating agents constitute the majority of the population,
and decreasing if α < 12 , which is the case of a majority
of anti-coordinating agents. Note that there is just one
solution of (13) that is z∗ = 12 regardless of the value of α
(Fig. 2).
Example 2. If coordinating agents and anti-coordinating
agents have the same threshold CDF, i.e., Fc(z) = 1 −
Ga(z), then Hα is monotone. Specifically, Hα is non-
decreasing if α > 12 and non-increasing if α <
1
2 . Note
that if α < 12 equation (13) admits exactly one solution.
(Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. On the left, we study the fixed point equation
(13) for Example 2 when thresholds are normally
distributed (µ = 0.3 , σ = 0.1). On the right, Fc 6= 1−
Ga and monotonicity is not guaranteed.
3. NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we investigate the existence, the uniqueness
and the characterization of the Nash equilibria of the
mixed CAC game. Recall that the utilities of the agents
are given by (1), while the best response function is given
by (4).
Our main result is to provide a necessary and sufficient
condition for an action configuration to be a Nash equi-
librium of the game. The condition, which is a slight
modification of (13), only involves the fractions of agents
playing action +1 in the whole population and in the
subsets Vc and Va.
Given a Nash equilibrium x∗ ∈ X , we shortly denote
z∗ := z(x∗), z∗c := zc(x
∗) and z∗a := za(x
∗).
Theorem 1. Consider the mixed CAC game.
(1) A Nash equilibrium x∗ ∈ X satisfies
z∗c = Fc
(
n
n− 1(z
∗ − c)
)
Ga
(
n
n− 1(z
∗ − a)
)
≥ z∗a ≥ Ga
(
n
n− 1z
∗
)
z∗ = αz∗c + (1− α)z∗a
(14)
for every c ∈ (0, 1n ] and a ∈ ( 1n , 2n ].
(2) Given z∗ ∈ {0, 1n , . . . , 1}, z∗c ∈ {0, 1nc , . . . , 1}, z∗a ∈
{0, 1na , . . . , 1} satisfying (14), there exists a Nash
equilibrium x∗ ∈ X such that z(x∗) = z∗, zc(x∗) = z∗c
and za(x
∗) = z∗a.
Remark 1. The Nash equilibrium whose existence is
guaranteed by (2) can be built in the following way. First,
we set the actions of the coordinating agents i ∈ Vc
accordingly to the following formula
x∗i =

+1 if ri ≤ n
n− 1
(
z∗ − 1
n
)
−1 if ri ≥ n
n− 1 z
∗
(15)
Then, we force the actions of the anti-coordinating agents
i ∈ Va to satisfy
x∗i =

−1 if ri < n
n− 1
(
z∗ − 1
n
)
+1 if ri >
n
n− 1 z
∗ .
(16)
Finally, we set the actions of the anti-coordinating agents
i ∈ Va having thresholds ri ∈ [ nn−1 (z∗ − 1n ), nn−1 z∗] in
such a way that the condition z∗(x∗) = z∗ is satisfied. In
general, the associated Nash equilibrium is not unique.
Proposition 1 gives a tool to investigate the existence of
Nash equilibria of the mixed CAC game. Furthermore, it
permits to characterize all the Nash equilibria of the game.
Indeed, if we find all the possible triples of fractions z∗c , z
∗
a
and z∗ satisfying (14), then we are able to build all the
Nash equilibria of the game.
Remark. Note that, given a triple z∗c , z
∗
a, z
∗ satisfying
(14), it is enough to know the value of z∗ to find z∗c and
z∗a. Hence, there are at most n + 1 triples satisfying the
conditions in (14). Recalling that the discoordination game
admits no Nash equilibria, we have that, in general,
0 ≤ |Z| ≤ n+ 1
where we denote by Z the set of the solutions of (14).
In the following sections, we analyze the coordination game
and the anti-coordination game as special cases having
α = 1 and α = 0, respectively.
3.1 Nash equilibria of the coordination game
We focus on the coordination game, i.e., Vc = V. We
recall that, since the game is potential, the existence of
Nash equilibria is guaranteed. Proposition 1 provides a
characterization of all the Nash equilibria of the game.
A straightforward substitution of α = 1 in (14) leads to
Corollary 1, that provides a sufficient and necessary condi-
tion for an action configuration to be a Nash equilibrium
based on the relation between the fraction z∗ of agents
playing action +1 and the threshold CDF Fc.
Corollary 1. Consider the coordination game.
(1) A Nash equilibrium x∗ ∈ X satisfies
z∗ = Fc
(
n
n− 1(z
∗ − c)
)
(17)
for every c ∈ (0, 1n ].
(2) Given z∗ ∈ {0, 1n , . . . , 1} satisfying (17), there exists
a Nash equilibrium x∗ ∈ X such that z(x∗) = z∗.
Remark. The Nash equilibrium whose existence is guar-
anteed by (2) can be built by setting the actions of the
agents accordingly to (15). For any z∗ satisfying (17), the
associated Nash equilibrium is unique.
Remark. A solution of (17) is a fraction z∗ such that
Fc
(
n
n− 1(z −
1
n
)
)
= F−c (
n
n− 1z
∗) = z∗
where F−c (z) := lima→z− Fc(a) denotes the left limit of Fc
in z. This is the same as asking that
(1) z∗ is a fixed point of F−c (
n
n−1z
∗)
(2) z∗ is such that the threshold CDF Fc is flat before z∗
for an interval that is large at least 1n .
If there are no stubborn agents, then F (0) = 0 and
F (n−1n ) = 1 and, therefore, z
0 = 0 and z1 = 1 are solutions
of (17). The two solutions correspond to the two consensus
configurations.
There might be other solutions, different from consensus
configurations. More specifically there can be up to n+ 1
solutions, as shown in Example 3. Hence, recalling that
N denotes the set of the Nash equilibria of the game and
Fig. 4. In Example 3, the condition in (17) admits n + 1
solutions, including z0 = 0 and z1 = 1.
Z denotes the set of the solutions of (17), we have the
following result.
Proposition 2. The coordination game admits
|N | = |K|
Nash equilibria over Kn, where 1 ≤ |K| ≤ n+ 1.
Example 3. Given the set of thresholds ri = 0,
1
n−1 , . . . , 1,
for i ∈ V, the condition in (17) admits the n+ 1 solutions
z = 0, 1n , . . . , 1, as shown in Fig. 4. Hence, the associated
coordination game admits n+ 1 Nash equilibria.
We remark that a fixed point of Fc(
n
n−1z) is a solution of
(17) only if there is a flat interval preceding the fixed point
that is at least large 1n . We provide an example where
Fc(
n
n−1z) admits a fixed point, but the game admits no
Nash equilibria.
Example 4. Let n > 0 be an odd number. We consider a
set of thresholds
ri =

1
2
− i if i ≤ n− 1
2
1
2
+ i if i >
n− 1
2
where i ∈ [0, 1n−1 ), for all i ∈ V. In Fig. 5 we observe
that z∗ = n−12n is a fixed point of Fc(
n
n−1z) but it is not
a solution of (17). Accordingly, note that, if we consider
an action configuration x∗ where z(x∗) = z∗, then agents
playing action +1 are not in equilibrium. Indeed,
|{j ∈ V \ {i} | xj = +1}|
n− 1 =
n−1
2 − 1
n− 1 =
n− 3
2(n− 1) < ri
for every i ∈ V.
3.2 Nash equilibria of the anti-coordination game
We focus on the anti-coordination game, i.e. Va = V.
The existence of Nash equilibria is again guaranteed by
the potential property, even though a complete charac-
terization of them is not given. Proposition 1 provides a
characterization of all the Nash equilibria of the game.
A straightforward substitution of α = 0 in (14) leads to
Corollary 3, that provides a sufficient and necessary condi-
tion for an action configuration to be a Nash equilibrium
based on the fraction z∗ of agents playing action +1 and
the threshold CCDF Ga.
Fig. 5. In Example 4, z0 = 0 and z1 = 1 are the only
solutions of (17). Even if z∗ = n−12n is a fixed point
of Fc(
n
n−1z), the function is not flat in the interval
[z∗ − 1n , z∗).
Corollary 3. Consider the anti-coordination game.
(1) A Nash equilibrium x∗ ∈ X satisfies
Ga
(
n
n− 1(z
∗ − a)
)
≥ z∗ ≥ Ga
(
n
n− 1z
∗
)
(18)
for every a ∈ ( 1n , 2n ].
(2) Given z∗ ∈ {0, 1n , . . . , 1} satisfying (18), there exists
a Nash equilibrium x∗ ∈ X such that z(x∗) = z∗.
Remark. The Nash equilibrium whose existence is guar-
anteed by (2) can be built by setting the actions of part of
the agents as in (16) and the remaining actions in such a
way that the condition z∗(x∗) = z∗ is met. Note that the
associated Nash equilibrium is, in general, not unique.
Remark. A solution of (18) is a fraction z∗ such that
G−a
(
n
n− 1(z
∗ − 1
n
)
)
≥ z∗ ≥ Ga
(
n
n− 1z
∗
)
where G−a (z) denotes the left limit of Ga in z.
Note that a fixed point z∗ ∈ {0, 1n , . . . , 1} of the threshold
CCDF, namely z∗ = Ga( nn−1z
∗), satisfies (18). If Ga has
no fixed points, it is possible to prove that the inequality
in (18) is satisfied by the first fraction z∗ for which
the bisector is over (or equal to) the function Ga, i.e.
z∗ ∈ {0, 1n , . . . , 1} such that
z∗ − 1
n
< Ga
(
n
n− 1(z
∗ − 1
n
)
)
z∗ ≥ Ga
(
n
n− 1z
∗
)
.
(19)
Proposition 4. Given a threshold CCDF Ga, the fraction
z∗ ∈ {0, 1n , . . . , 1} satisfying (19) is a solution of (18).
Such a z∗ always exists since Ga is non-increasing with
codomain [0, 1]. An example is shown in Fig. 6.
We proved that there are at most two z ∈ {0, 1n , . . . , 1}
satisfying (18). Indeed, if there is a sufficiently big jump
between Ga(z
∗) and Ga(z∗ − ),  > 0 sufficiently small,
then z∗∗ = z∗ + 1n−1 satisfies (18) too. We remark that
this is the only other possible solution. An example of this
situation is shown in Fig. 7.
Fig. 6. An example where inequality in (18) admits the
unique solution z∗ = 918 .
Let us denote
z1 := Ga
(
n
n− 1z
∗
)
z2 := G
−
a
(
n
n− 1(z
∗ − 1
n
)
)
.
(20)
We have the following result on the number of Nash
equilibria of the anti-coordination game.
Proposition 5. The anti-coordination game admits exactly
|N | =
∑
z∈Z
(
n(z2 − z1)
n(z − z1)
)
(21)
Nash equilibria over Kn, where 1 ≤ |Z| ≤ 2.
Hence, if |Z| = 1 and z∗ = z1 or z∗ = z2, the game
admits exactly one Nash equilibrium. Indeed, recalling the
construction of Nash equilibria from z∗, we see that there
is just one possible choice for the set of the agents playing
action 1 in a Nash equilibrium configuration.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We considered mixed ensembles of agents playing coordi-
nating and anti-coordinating agents with possibly different
activation thresholds. We found a necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of Nash equilibria in terms of
the distribution of the thresholds in the ensemble and an
explicit characterization of Nash equilibria when do exist.
Current work includes the extension of this analysis to
the case when agents are confined to interact through a
network. Preliminary results in this direction can be found
in Vanelli (2019). Also, we are interested in the behavior
of evolutionary dynamics associated to these games, such
as the the best response dynamics.
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Appendix A. PROOFS
Proof. (Proposition 1) Notation for proof. Given an
action configuration x ∈ X , we denote V+(x) :=
{j ∈ V | xj = +1} and n+(x) := |V+(x)|. We define
z˜(x) :=
{j ∈ V | xj = +1}
n− 1 =
n+(x)
n− 1 (A.1)
The normalization factor is due to the fact that each agent
interact with n−1 agents. Note that, for any configuration
x ∈ X , if i ∈ V+(x) then
n+i (x)
n− 1 =
n+(x)− 1
n− 1 = z˜(x)−
1
n− 1 (A.2)
while if i ∈ V−(x) := V \ V+(x) then
n+i (x)
n− 1 =
n+(x)
n− 1 = z˜(x) . (A.3)
Furthermore, if Va 6= ∅ and Vc 6= ∅, we denote by V+c (x) :={j ∈ Vc | xj = +1} and V+a (x) := {j ∈ Va | xj = +1} the
subsets of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents, re-
spectively, playing action 1 in x and by n+c (x) := |V+c (x)|
and n+a (x) := |V+c (x)| their cardinalities. If nc > 1 and
na > 1, we define
z˜c(x) :=
n+c (x)
nc − 1 , z˜a(x) :=
n+a (x)
na − 1
Observe that, if we define α˜ = nc−1n−1 , then
z˜(x) = α˜z˜c(x) +
(
n
n− 1 − α˜
)
z˜a(x) (A.4)
Finally, we denote the re-normalized threshold CDF of the
coordinating agents by
F˜c(z) :=
1
nc − 1 |{i ∈ Vc | ri ≤ z}| ,
while we denote the re-normalized threshold CCDF of the
anti-coordinating agents by
G˜a(z) :=
1
na − 1 |{i ∈ Va | ri > z}| .
Necesssary condition. A substitution of (A.2) and (A.3) in
(4) leads to the following condition on Nash equilibria
x ∈ N ⇔

ri ≤ z˜(x)− 1
n− 1 i ∈ V
+
c (x)
ri ≥ z˜(x) i ∈ V−c (x)
ri ≥ z˜(x)− 1
n− 1 i ∈ V
+
a (x)
ri ≤ z˜(x) i ∈ V−a (x)
(A.5)
The first condition in (A.5) allows to find an upper bound
for the fraction of coordinating agents playing action +1
in a Nash equilibrium x∗ ∈ X , i.e. z˜c(x∗). In fact, the
number of coordinating agents choosing +1 in the Nash
equilibrium is at most equal to the total number of
coordinating agents having threshold less or equal than
z˜(x∗)− 1n−1 . In formulas,
z˜c(x
∗) =
n+c (x
∗)
nc − 1
≤ 1
nc − 1 |{i ∈ Vc | ri ≤ z˜(x
∗)− 1/(n− 1)}|
= F˜c(z˜(x
∗)− 1/(n− 1))
Similarly, the second condition in (A.5) can be used to
find a lower bound for z˜c(x
∗). Indeed, the number of
coordinating agents choosing −1 in the Nash equilibrium
is at most equal to the total number of coordinating agents
having threshold greater or equal than z˜(x∗), i.e.,
nc
nc − 1 − z˜c(x
∗) =
n−c (x
∗)
nc − 1
≤ 1
nc − 1 |{i ∈ Vc | ri ≥ z˜(x
∗)}|
≤ 1
nc − 1 |{i ∈ Vc | ri > z˜(x
∗)− ˜c}|
=
nc
nc − 1 −
|{i ∈ Vc | ri ≤ z˜(x∗)− ˜c}|
nc − 1
=
nc
nc − 1 − F˜c(z˜(x
∗)− ˜c)
for every ˜c > 0. We introduced the constant ˜c > 0 with
the aim of writing the condition in terms of the threshold
CDF of coordinating agents.
If we combine the two, we find that, for every ˜c > 0,
F˜c(z˜(x
∗)− 1/(n− 1)) ≥ z˜c(x∗) ≥ F˜c(z˜(x∗)− ˜c) (A.6)
Observe that, since F˜c is a non-decreasing function,
F˜c(z˜(x
∗)− 1/(n− 1)) ≤ F˜c(z˜(x∗)− ˜c) if ˜c ≤ 1n−1 . Hence,
(A.6) is satisfied if and only if
F˜c(z˜(x
∗)− 1/(n− 1)) = F˜c(z˜(x∗)− ˜c) .
for 0 < ˜c ≤ 1n−1 . The 1st necessary condition is then
z˜c(x
∗) = F˜c(z˜(x∗)− ˜c) (A.7)
for every 0 < ˜c ≤ 1n−1 .
We now aim to derive an upper bound and a lower bound
for z˜a(x
∗). Note that the number of anti-coordinating
agents playing action +1 in x∗ is at most equal to the
total number of agents having threshold greater or equal
than z˜(x∗)− 1n−1 (third condition in (A.5)). In formulas,
z˜a(x
∗) =
n+a (x)
na − 1
≤ 1
na − 1 |{i ∈ Va | ri ≥ z˜(x
∗)− 1/(n− 1)}|
≤ 1
na − 1 |{i ∈ Va | ri > z˜(x
∗)− (1 + ˜a)/(n− 1)}|
= G˜a(z˜(x
∗)− (1 + ˜a)/(n− 1))
for every ˜a > 0. Similarly, according to the fourth
condition of (A.5), we have that the number of anti-
coordinating agents playing action −1 in x∗ is at most
equal to the total number of agents having threshold less
or equal than z˜(x∗), i.e.,
na
na − 1 − z˜a(x
∗) =
n−a (x)
na − 1
≤ 1
na − 1 |{i ∈ Va | ri ≤ z˜(x
∗)}|
=
na
na − 1 − G˜a(z˜(x
∗))
By combining the two, we find the 2nd necessary condition
G˜a(z˜(x
∗)− (1 + ˜a)/(n−1)) ≥ z˜a(x∗) ≥ G˜a(z˜(x∗)) (A.8)
for every ˜a > 0. Since G˜a is a non-increasing function, it
is sufficient for the condition to hold for ˜a > 0 sufficiently
small. Then we can restrict to ˜a ∈ (0, 1].
If we combine the necessary conditions in (A.7) and (A.8)
and we recall the relation between z˜c, z˜a and z˜ observed
in (A.4), we obtain the following necessary condition for
x∗ ∈ N to be a Nash equilibrium:
z˜c(x
∗) = F˜c(z˜(x∗)− ˜c)
G˜a(z˜(x
∗)− (1 + ˜a)/(n− 1)) ≥ z˜a(x∗) ≥ G˜a(z˜(x∗))
z˜(x∗) = α˜z˜c(x∗) +
(
n
n− 1 − α˜
)
z˜a(x
∗)
for every ˜c ∈ (0, 1n−1 ] and ˜a ∈ (0, 1] sufficiently small.
Note that, for every ˜c ∈ (0, 1n−1 ], ∃c ∈ (0, 1n ] such that
z˜(x∗)− ˜c = n
n− 1(z
∗ − c) .
Similarly, given ˜a ∈ (0, 1], ∃a ∈ ( 1n , 2n ] such that
z˜(x∗)− 1 + ˜a
n− 1 =
n
n− 1(z
∗ − a) .
Furthermore
α˜z˜c(x
∗) =
n
n− 1αzc(x
∗)
The system in Proposition 1 is obtained by applying these
three substitutions and by multiplying all terms by n−1n .
Sufficient condition. The conditions in (14) guarantee that
an action configuration built in the way presented in
Remark 1 satisfies z∗c (x
∗) = z∗c and z
∗
a(x
∗) = z∗a. Then,
it is possible to verify that such an action configuration,
that in general is not unique, is a Nash equilibrium of the
mixed CAC game.
Proof. (Proposition 4) Consider z∗ ∈ {0, 1n , . . . , 1} satis-
fying (19). The right-hand inequalityb in (18) is satisfied
by definition of z∗, while the left-hand inequality is satis-
fied since Im(Ga) =
{
0, 1n , . . . , 1
}
. Indeed,
z∗ − 1
n
< Ga
(
n
n− 1(z
∗ − 1
n
)
)
⇒
z∗ ≤ Ga
(
n
n− 1(z
∗ − 1
n
)
)
(1)
≤ Ga
(
n
n− 1(z
∗ − a)
)
where (1) holds for every a ∈ ( 1n , 2n ] since the complemen-
tary cumulative distribution function is non-increasing.
Proof. (Proposition 5) Recall that |Z| ≥ 1 as the game is
potential. More specifically, z∗ satisfying (19) always exists
and it is a solution of (18) according to Proposition 4. Let
us consider the fraction z∗∗ := z∗ + 1/n . Note that the
right-hand inequality in (18) is always satisfied as
z∗∗ = z∗ +
1
n
(1)
≥ Ga
(
n
n− 1z
∗
)
(2)
≥ Ga
(
n
n− 1(z
∗∗)
)
,
where (1) holds by definition of z∗ and (2) as Ga is non-
increasing. On the other hand, z∗∗ is a solution of the
left-hand inequality, if
z∗∗ ≤ G+a
(
n
n− 1(z
∗∗ − 1
n
)
)
⇔
z∗ +
1
n
≤ Ga
(
n
n− 1(z
∗ − )
)
for every  > 0. Note that a necessary condition for it to
be satisfied is
Ga
(
n
n− 1(z
∗ − )
)
−Ga
(
n
n− 1z
∗
)
≥ 1
n
which means that there must be a jump discontinuity
point in z∗. If the jump is sufficiently big, then |Z| = 2.
Otherwise, Z = 1.
A fraction z < z∗ cannot be a solution (18) as z <
Ga(
n
n−1z) . On the other hand, if we consider z > z
∗ + 1n
then we have that z > z∗ ≥ Ga(z∗) ≥ Ga(z− a) for some
a ∈ ( 1n , 2n ]. Hence, 1 ≤ |Z| ≤ 2.
We conclude by observing that, given z satisfying (18) and
z1 and z2 defined as (20), the quantity
(
n(z2−z1)
n(z−z1)
)
counts
all the possible ways of setting the actions of the agents
having thresholds ri ∈ [ nn−1 (z∗− 1n ), nn−1 z∗] in such a way
that the condition z(x) = z is met (see (16)).
